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the defendant which was barred by the statute of limitations. 0
The court recognized the fraud cause of action, holding that whenever the fraud is extraneous to the barred cause of action it may
be the basis for a separate claim, with the benefit of the discovery
provisions of the CPLR."
In DeVito, the court properly sustained the cause of action
for fraud since the misrepresentation was directed at preventing
the commencement of the action for personal injuries. Such
fraud is separate and distinct from the original tort; one inflicting
personal injuries, the other preventing just recompense for such
injuries. This is unlike Brick v. Cohen-Hall-Marx Co., 12 where
royalties under a sales contract were fraudulently computed. Such
a misrepresentation of royalties due under a sales contract was
held to be so integral a part of the contract, however fraudulent,
that the essence of the action was in contract. Thus in Brick,
the fraud was not extraneous to the original grounds for relief.
Running of six-month extension to statute of limitations after
prior termination of same cause.
In Dinerman v. Sutton,13 the court refused to allow plaintiff
the benefit of the CPLR 205(a) extension holding that the sixmonth period runs from the entering of the order terminating the
prior action and not from service on plaintiff of the order.1 4
Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the filing
of notice of appeal tolls the six-month extension, stating that mere
filing of a notice of appeal is of no effect where there was no
disposition of the merits on appeal.1" If the appeal is prosecuted,
the six-month extension runs from the date of entry of the order
determining the appeal or, in the alternative, from the entry of
judgment on remittitur. 1
CPLR 213(2): MV7AIC uninsured motorist endorsement makes
six-year contract statute of limitations applicable.
The Insurance Law dictates that every automobile liability
insurance contract must include a statement by the carrier that the
10 CPLR 214(5).
11 CPLR 213(9).

The plaintiff will have two years from the discovery
of the fraud or six years from its perpetration which ever is longer. Compare
CPLR 213(9), with CPLR 203(f).
12276 N.Y. 259, 11 N.E.2d 902 (1937).
1345 Misc. 2d 791, 258 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
14 Cf. Troiano v. Kinney Motors, Inc., 276 App. Div. 869, 93 N.Y.S.2d
368 (2d Dep't 1949).
15Accord, Taylor v. G.P. Putnam's & Son, 41 Misc. 2d 1003, 247
N.Y.S.2d 80 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
16 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 205, supp. commentary 21 (1965).
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insured may recover from MVAIC for injuries caused by an
uninsured or unidentified motorist.' 7 Such a provision is known
as the uninsured motorist endorsement. In MVAIC v. McDonnell,'
the plaintiff's insurance policy contained such a clause and, is
required by the Insurance Law, the deceased's executor demanded
arbitration on the wrongful death claim.' 9 MVAIC contended
that the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death 20
barred plaintiff's demand for arbitration. The court, however,
concluded that the claim was based on the uninsured motorist
endorsement as provided in the insurance contract rather than
on the unidentified motorist's negligence which caused the automobile accident, and therefore, the six-year statute of limitations
for contract actions was applicable. 2 1 It is important to note
that a "qualified person," i.e., one who does not have automobile
liability insurance, would not have the benefit of the breach of
contract statute of limitations since the claim will not have arisen
out of an insurance contract. Therefore, the two-year statute
of limitations for a wrongful death action or the three-year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions would be applicable.
General Municipal Law Section 50-e: Statutory or judicial stay
of an action as extending the statute of limitations and its
applicability to the Public Authorities Law.
CPLR 204(a) provides that where commencement of an action
is stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of
that stay is not included in computing the time within which the
action 22must be commenced. In Barchet v. New York City Trans.
Auth., the defense of the statute of limitations was raised since
the action had not been commenced within one year and thirty
days after the accrual of the claim.2 3 The plaintiff, pointing out
that the court had taken fifty-three days to adjudicate the request
to file a late notice of claim, contended that such time should
not be computed in the running of the statute. 24 Furthermore,
17

N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2-a).

1823 App. Div. 2d 773, 258 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1965).
' 0 Note, MVAIC Six Years Later-A Practical Appraisal, 39 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 321, 335-37 (1965).
20 N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 130.

CPLR 213.
Misc. 2d 414, 259 N.Y.S2d 470 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
23 N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 1212(2) ; Forastad v. New York City Trans.
Auth., 13 App. Div. 2d 836, 216 N.Y.S2d 116 (2d Dep't 1961) ; Hernandez
v. New York City Trans. Auth., 41 Misc. 2d 123, 245 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup.
Ct. 1963), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 968, 251 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Ist Dep't 1964).
This section demands compliance
AUTH. LAW § 1212(2).
24 N.Y. Pu.
with § 50-e of the General Municipal Law which requires a notice of claim
to be filed within ninety days after the accrual of the claim.
21
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